

## II. Role of Patent Rights in Economic and Technological Development

Walter G. Park,  
American University

ASRT/WIPO Meeting  
Cairo, Egypt  
November 12, 2011

# Outline

## A. Innovation and Development

- Indicators
- Trends

## B. Impact of Patent Rights

- Theory
- Evidence
  - Minor Inventions
  - Outward Orientation
- Lessons

# A. Innovation and Development

## Real Per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP)

<u>Country Group:</u>	<u>1995</u>	<u>2009</u>	<u>Growth 1995-2009</u>
Developed economies	27720	33902	22.3%
Developing economies	1495	2475	65.5%
Developing economies: Africa	893	1188	33.0%
Developing economies: America	4217	5290	25.4%
Developing economies: Asia	1226	2386	94.7%
Developing economies: Oceania	2505	2326	-7.2%
Least developed countries	290	483	66.2%

Source: UNCTAD.org

(Figures are in constant 2005 U.S. dollars)

# Research & Development

## Gross Domestic R&D Expenditure


	% of GDP		% share in World R&D		% share of World Researchers	
	2002	2007	2002	2007	2002	2007
<b>World</b>	<b>1.7%</b>	<b>1.7%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>
Developed countries	2.2%	2.3%	82.6%	76.2%	69.7%	62.1%
Developing countries	0.8%	1.0%	17.2%	23.7%	29.8%	37.4%
Less-developed countries	0.2%	0.2%	0.1%	0.1%	0.5%	0.5%

Source: UNESCO

	Ratio of R&D to GDP (%)		Share of R&D financed by Business Sector	
	1998 - 2000	2008 - 2010	1998 - 2000	2008 - 2010
USA	2.6	2.8	67%	67%
Canada	1.8	2.0	45%	48%
China	0.65	1.5	60%	72%
Egypt	0.19	0.21	n/a	n/a
India	0.74	0.76	23%	35%
S. Korea	2.3	3.4	70%	73%


Source: UNESCO

# Patent (Priority Filings by Inventor Country)



*Source: European Patent Office, INPADOC*

## Trilateral Filings by Inventor Country (USPTO, EPO, & JPO)



Note: Trilateral Filings by Developing Countries are magnified by a factor of 10

*Source: European Patent Office, INPADOC*



## B. Impact of Patent Rights

*(on Innovation and Technological Development)*

### Theoretical Perspectives

- Incentives for Invention
- Incentives for Commercialization
- Disclosure of Inventions





# Other considerations

- Sequential and cumulative innovation
  - Bessen and Maskin (2009)
- Optimal Strength varies between North and South
  - Grossman and Lai (2004)
- Threshold Effects
  - Eicher and Penalosa (2008)
- Incremental Innovation and learning-by-doing
  - Suthersanen (2006)

# Empirical Evidence

- Effect of Patent Rights on Innovation
  - Significant in Developed Countries
  - Lagged effects in Developing
  - Patent protection effective if indigenous technological capacity is present
    - Minor inventions and utility models act as a stepping stone
    - Reverse causality: Increased technological capacity results in stronger protection for patent rights.
- In the longer run, stronger patent rights are associated with increased outward orientation of firms
  - Increased productivity and incentives to commercialize new innovations
    - Source of exports, outward FDI and licensing receipts

# On Innovation: Kim et al. (2011) *Research Policy*

‘Role Reversal’:

- $R\&D = f(\text{Patent Laws, Utility Model Laws, } \mathbf{Z}) + \varepsilon$   


“+” effect in high income sample only      “+” effect in mid-to-low income sample only      Control Variables      Error
- $GDP \text{ per capita growth} = f(\text{Patentable Innovations, Utility Model Innovations, } \mathbf{Z}) + \varepsilon$   

“+” effect in high income sample only      “+” effect in mid-to-low income sample only
- $\text{Patentable Innovations} = f(\text{Lagged Utility Model Innovations, } \mathbf{Z}) + \varepsilon$   


“+” contribution in mid-to-low income sample

IPR is a nonlinear function of GDP per capita:

$$\text{Index of Patent Rights} = f(\overset{\text{"-"}}{\text{GDPC}}, \overset{\text{"+"}}{\text{GDPC}^2}, \textcolor{red}{Z}) + \varepsilon$$



# On Outward Orientation



# Affiliates of U.S. Multinational Firms

<b>Affiliates in Developed Countries</b>	<b>1982</b>	<b>1989</b>	<b>1994</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>2004</b>
Domestic Sales Only	27.7	27.2	32.1	38.2	32.4
Exports & Domestic Sales	54.3	55.4	49.5	43.8	50.1
Outward Licensing	17.9	17.4	15.1	18.0	17.5

<b>Affiliates in Developing Countries</b>	<b>1982</b>	<b>1989</b>	<b>1994</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>2004</b>
Domestic Sales Only	40.5	41.4	40.0	38.2	31.0
Exports & Domestic Sales	57.2	54.8	56.0	56.4	63.8
Outward Licensing	2.3	3.8	4.0	5.4	5.2

% of firms with respective activity

# Patents Granted at U.S.P.T.O

	Rank 2010	Rank 2004
Japan	1	1
Germany	2	2
<b>S. Korea</b>	3	4
<b>Taiwan</b>	4	3
Canada	5	7
France	6	6
U.K.	7	5
<b>China</b>	8	19
Israel	9	12
Italy	10	8

# Briggs & Park (2011)

- Large Micro Dataset of Firms
- Firm Exports and Outward Licensing are a significantly positive function of I.P.R., controlling for other factors, like Productivity.
  - Sample selection bias treated
  - Especially in developing countries
- Sequential Pattern
  - Local sales → Exporting → Licensing
    - due to sunk costs of entering export & licensing market, where sunk costs associated with licensing are higher
- Increased unaffiliated (arm's length) licensing



# Key Lessons

- Lagged Effects of Patent Reform on Innovation and Technological Development
  - Weak 'short run' effects
  - Adjustment period
- Minor Inventions can create “learning by doing” and raise potential to conduct major inventions
  - Patent rights as a luxury good: rises with income
- Developing economies still lagging, but have narrowed the gap in technological development
- Eventually, stronger patent protection increases local innovative capacity, productivity, and the commercialization of local innovations
  - via exports and licensing to the rest of the world (ROW)
  - Local products are more attractive to ROW if technological content (or product quality) is higher
  - Patents provide incentive to invest in product quality and to bring products to the marketplace.